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The Declaration of Independence declares that among the inalien-
able rights are "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Nothing
more intimately concerns the pursuit -of happiness than the choice of
marriage relations. It would seem to be a direct inference from this
proposition that all men and women should be permitted to contract
such relations as seemed to them desirable and to dissolve those rela-
tions when they saw fit and make new ones. This apparently logical
conclusion has been adopted by a considerable class of people, many
of whom deserve the highest respect both in regard to intelligence
and character. Milton, not only the greatest of poets, but the strong-
est and purest of men, practically maintained this doctrine in his
articles on the liberty of marriage and divorce, asserting that incom-
patibility of disposition ought to be a sufficient cause for dissolving
the relation; that moral defects were of more importance and defeat-
ed the purpose of the marriage as fully as physical disqualifications.
There are many people at the present time who maintain the same
position, supporting it honestly and passionately.
-There is another larger and much more numerous class who hold
that marriage is a sacrament ordained of God beyond the reach of
any earthly power to dissolve, and that any relations contracted by
such divorced parties with others are merely concubinage. Such is
the doctrine of the Catholic church. This latter class, however, is.
and must always be in this country, in a hopeless minority, although
their views have been sanctioned by one state-South Carolina,
which does not allow divorce for any cause. The first class also are
in the minority and will probably always remain so.
The great majority of the people of the United States, although
holding that marriage is not a sacrament, that it is a mere human re-
lation which may be contracted at will and may be dissolved with
the sanction of the state, believe that it is not a matter which con-
cerns the individual contracting parties alone; that the state has an
interest and may by its law interfere between the parties respecting
the right of marriage and the right of separation.
This intermediate third class might be divided into two divis-
ions-one holding that divorce should be solely on the ground of
adultery, the other that various grounds which utterly destroy the
happiness of the parties and totally defeat the purposes of the mar-
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riage relation should also be admissible. As to what those causes
should be there is infinite diversity, some states recognizing habit-
ual drunkenness or intolerable cruelty and some not. The same being
true in regard to desertion, failure of support, and so on down to
outbreaks of intolerable temper, and other vaguely described as "the
infliction of grievous mental suffering by one party to the marriage,"
which may be held by construction.to mean almost anything from a
severe, clubbing to a refusal of a spring bonnet.
The conference at Washington was called by invitation of the
Governor of Pennsylvania' in the hope of preparing a uniform
divorce law, and was a large and distinguished gathering, including
as it did leading members of the judiciary, dignitaries of the Catholic
church, prominent clergymen, lawyers, etc. Delegates from forty.
one states, including the District of Columbia, were present. It
was apparent that there was an irreconcilable diversity in the views
of the various states concerning the causes of divorce. These differ-
ences of opinion are.inherent in the conditions of the various states.
In some of the newer western states ideas of individual freedom are
pushed to a greater extreme and the people are less patient of legal
restriction upon freedom of contract. In the conservative East, on
the other hand, regulations and restrictions are more patiently borne.
It is evident also that the religious convictions of the people would
affect this subject. The membership of the convention reflected
these differences of opinion.
The Pennsylvania delegates, who naturally and properly took a
leading position in the deliberations of the convention, had suggested
outlines for a uniform divorce code and also certain declaratory reso-
lutions, but it was speedily recognized that anything like a uniform
code was impossible. It was found practical, however, to agree on
certain fundamental principles as to procedure and regulations which
should be directed to prevent the conflict 'of jurisdiction between the
states.. It was also agreed that stringent regulations should be adopt-
ed to prevent fraud, collusion, and over-haste in granting divorces.
It is a somewhat singular coincidence that the recent decision
of Haddock v. Haddock in the U. S. Supreme Court, that one state
is not bound to recognize a divorce decree -of another state where
there was not full jurisdiction of both the parties, came out soon
after the meeting of the convention, and is in accord with the views
taken by the convention on this subject.
The final result of the convention was the adoption of seventeen
declaratory resolutions adapted to carry out the objects above stated.
To quote all these resolutioris would unduly extend the length of this
article. They included distinct resolutions condemning divorces ex-
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cept where one of the parties had a bona fide residence and civorces
to plaintiffs resident in another state at the time the cause of divorce
arose for causes not recognized in such state. This was aimed to pre-
vent the scandal of migratory divorces; that is, divorces granted
to persons who move from one state to another to avoid the whole-
some restrictions of the laws of their own states.
In three particulars the convention did make recommendations
concerning causes of divorce. It declared that a decree should not
be granted for insanity arising after marriage, and tlhat conviction
of crime should not be recognized as a cause unless followed by
continuous imprisonment for at least two years, or in case of indeter-
minate sentence, one year; also that the conviction should be the
result of a trial before a court granting a trial by jury; and that in
case of desertion only wilful desertion persisted in for two years
should be sufficient.
Two provisions were recommended which would introduce im-
portant new features into the practice of Connecticut and of many of
the other states. The first provides for the recognition of separation
a mnensa et thoro. The argument on this subject being that, while
divorces a vinculo giving a right of re-marriage, ought not to be
granted except for very serious cases, yet a party, particularly a wife,
should be entitled to protection in cases not recognized as causes
of divorce, but which yet made it improper or unsafe lfor the par-
ties to live together. It was particularly urged upon the convention
that the members of the Catholic church, whose consciences would
prevent their seeking any dissolution of the marriage bond, should
yet have some remedy by which the one party could procure relief
in case of intolerable cruelty of the other, or in case for any reason
it became improper that the parties should live together. This in-
stitution is recognized by the laws of very many of the states, and
it would seem obvious that it should be recognized by all of them.
The argument on this subject would seem almost too strong for con-
troversy.
The other provision referred to is perhaps a subject of debate.
For the sake of clearness, the twelfth resolution, embodying the
suggestion, is here quoted:
"Hearings and trials should always be before the court, and
not before any delegated representative of it; and in all uncontested
divorce cases, and in any other divorce case where the court may
deem it necessary or proper, a disinterested attorney should be as-
signed by the court, actively to defend the case."
In uncontested cases of divorce it must frequently happen that
although the evidence on its face appears to be strong that the trier
would find difficulty in denying the relief, yet the circumstances
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leave an uncomfortable suspicion that the court has not had before it
all the facts properly bearing upon the case. It ought not to be nec-
essary for the court in such cases to constitute itself a detective
agency to ascertain such facts or secure the production of additional
evidence. If it attempts to do so it is compelled to put itself in an
apparently hostile position to one of the parties and its judgment is
perhaps affected by the fact that it does put itself in such a position.
If in such cases the court were at liberty to assign counsel to repre-
sent the absent party it would be relieved from this position. There
does not seem to be insuperable objection to a provision of this kind.
Not only has the absent party a right to the protection of counsel,
but the court has a right to take such measures as may
be necessary to protect itself from imposition. In such -cases of
course a moderate compensation would be taxed in favor of the
counsel for the defendant in analogy to the practice which prevails
in criminal cases.
The hearty reception of the call for the divorce convention em-
phasizes the increasing demand for a spirit of legislative comity
between the states. There has been an unfortunate tendency of the
various states towards a sort of legislative war. Certain states have
practically invited citizens of other states to come to them for relief
from the matrimonial restrictions which prevail in their own jurisdic-
tion. Others have taken measures to attract to their own juris-
diction individuals and business naturally belonging to other states
by advertising to grant charters without asking any questions, there-
by proposing to relieve citizens of other states from the wholesome
restrictions of their own jurisdiction designed to prevent fraud and
imposition. As a result of this, some of the states have legislated
against corporations of other states in order to protect themselves
against fraudulent enterprises. These conditions are becoming more
and more intolerable and have resulted in a demand for a central
supervision and regulation by the national government of matters
which are proper for state regulation. The continued existence of
our federal system is only possible or tolerable if a spirit of comity
as regards legislative provisions prevails between the states. The
general movement for uniformity of legislation among the states
not only on divorce but on a great variety of other subjects has
arisen out of this necessity.
Talcott H. Russell.
